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When external effects are important, markets will be 
inefficient, and economists have considered several 
broad classes of economic instruments to correct 
these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic 
analysis has tended to neglect important distinctions 
and interactions between the geographic scope of 
pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of 
government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the levels 
of government. For example, externalities generated 
in a particular local area may be confined to the local 
area or may spill over to other jurisdictions. Also, local 
governments may be well informed about how best 
to regulate or enforce pollution control within their 
jurisdiction, but they may not consider the effects of their 
actions on other jurisdictions. Finally, the existence of 
locally-generated waste emissions affects the appropriate 
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assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities 
among levels of government. The standard analysis 
therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate (or national) 
perspective, it typically ignores the possibility that 
the externality may be created and addressed by local 
governments, and it does not consider the implications of 
decentralization for the design of economic instruments 
targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines 
the implications of decentralization for the design 
of corrective policies; that is, how does one design 
economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in 
which externalities exist at the local level and in which 
subnational governments have the power to provide 
local public services, as well as to choose tax instruments 
that can both finance these expenditures and correct the 
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Introduction 
In many settings, markets can be a highly effective way to organize an economy, 
efficiently making the most of economic resources.  In such a system, agents compare 
private benefits and private costs, ignoring such “external costs” of their actions as 
pollution.  However, when these external effects are important, markets will not be 
efficient.  To correct such deficiencies, economists have considered three broad classes of 
economic instruments (EIs) (Cointrau and Hornig, 2003).  First, if pollution is 
measurable, setting a “Pigouvian tax” on pollution equal to the marginal external cost of 
environmental damage would provide the correct incentive to private agents.  Second, a 
”cap” on pollution may be set, with trades or offsets allowed in such a way that the total 
amount of pollution does not exceed the cap and with the specific agents who do the 
polluting determined by the market.  Third, if pollution is not measurable, “command and 
control” regulations may be imposed on agents’ behaviors, for example by requiring that 
a factory be required to use a particular pollution abatement technology. 
There is now a vast literature comparing and contrasting these approaches to 
controlling pollution.  However, the standard analysis in this literature has tended to take 
the region, and the government, as a given.  Consequently, it has tended to neglect 
important distinctions between the geographic scope of different pollutants, the 
enforcement authority of various levels of government, the fiscal authority of various 
levels of government, and the interactions among these factors.  For example:  
1.  Externalities generated in a particular local, or subnational, area may be confined 
to the local area or may spill over to other jurisdictions. 
  22.  Local governments may be better informed about how best to regulate or enforce 
pollution control within their jurisdiction, but they may not consider the effects of 
their actions on other jurisdictions. 
3.  The existence of locally-generated waste emissions affects the appropriate 
assignment of both expenditure and tax responsibilities among levels of 
government.  The Pigouvian corrective tax (or other economic instruments) may 
be chosen by the local government in various ways, either making its decision 
alone and ignoring the actions of other local governments, or making its decision 
while recognizing that its actions may elicit responses by other local governments 
as they respond in a strategic manner. 
The standard analysis therefore focuses mainly upon an aggregate, or national, 
perspective and typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created by, 
and addressed by, local governments.  Put differently, the standard analysis does not 
consider fully, if at all, the implications of decentralization for the design of economic 
instruments targeted at environmental problems. 
This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of 
economic instruments. That is, how does one design EIs in a decentralized fiscal system 
in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have 
the power both to provide local public goods and services and to choose tax instruments 
that can finance these expenditures and that can correct the market failures of 
externalities? 
 
1. Externalities and Market Failure: The Standard Approach 
The standard analysis of an externality starts with welfare economics and the 
conditions for “Pareto efficiency”, defined as a state in which no one can be made better 
off without adversely affecting someone else (Tresch, 2002).  A perfectly competitive 
market will produce a level of output where private benefits and costs are equal; more 
  3precisely, a competitive market will operate where marginal private benefits (MPB) to 
consumers equal marginal private costs (MPC) to producers.  Under some conditions, 
notably the absence of external effects in either production or consumption, the market 
will also achieve Pareto efficiency, producing a level of output at which marginal social 
benefits (MSB) equal marginal social costs (MSC). 
However, in the presence of external effects like pollution, private benefits and 
costs diverge from social benefits and costs.  In particular, when the production of a 
product also generates harmful emissions, there will be external, or spillover, costs from 
production; that is, there will be marginal external costs (MEC) from production of the 
good, so that MSC, defined as the sum of private and external costs, will exceed MPC by 
the amount of the MEC.  Because a competitive market will produce where MPB = MPC, 
the presence of pollution now implies that MPB (assumed equal to MSB) equals MPC, 
but that MSB < MSC ≡ MPC + MEC.  A competitive market will no longer achieve 
Pareto efficiency, producing both too much of the product that generates the pollution 
and doing so in a way that is too “dirty”. 
A comparable analysis focuses more directly on the emissions that characterize 
the pollution-generating activity, and is useful for subsequent discussion of 
decentralization.  Suppose that the utility of a (representative) consumer depends upon 
his or her consumption both of a private good and of the level of pollution.  Pollution is 
generated by emissions, or waste discharges, that result from the production of the private 
good, and production of the private good depends positively upon the use of traditional 
inputs (e.g., capital and labor), negatively upon the level of pollution, and positively upon 
the quantity of emissions.  Emissions are therefore treated as a factor of production like 
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more capital or more labor, but also by the discharge of more waste because more waste 
discharges do not require the use of other inputs to limit their use. 
In this framework, it is straightforward to demonstrate that a competitive market 
will generate a level of emissions where the marginal private benefits of emissions are 
driven to zero, because emissions are effectively a “free” input whose use does not 
require the payment of any factor payments comparable to, say, wages paid for labor.  
However, the market outcome will lead to an inefficiently large amount of emissions, 
because private firms that generate the emissions will not consider the external costs of 
emissions on consumers (who are hurt by more pollution) or on other firms (whose 
production is also negatively affected by more pollution). 
However, as noted earlier, there are several corrective policies that a government 
can pursue (Sterner, 2003).  The simplest corrective policy is a so-called Pigouvian tax, 
equal to the marginal external costs of the pollution at the efficient level of output.  The 
imposition of such a tax brings private costs into line with social costs and thereby 
achieves the efficient level of production of the good.  Polluters who have the lowest cost 
of abatement will reduce pollution the most, and polluters who have the highest cost will 
do less abating.  In addition to such static efficiency, Pigouvian taxes have the dynamic 
property of creating an incentive (namely, a reduction in tax payments) for entrepreneurs 
to develop more efficient ways to reduce pollution.  Although they are simple in theory, 
implementing such taxes in practice raises challenges related to the measurement of the 
marginal external costs and the monitoring of the pollution levels subject to taxation. 
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cleanup.  In this EI, firms face the same marginal incentive as a tax, but the incentive is in 
the form of a “carrot” (e.g., a subsidy) rather than a “stick” (e.g., a tax).  This has the 
advantage of making the instrument more politically palatable, but it also has the 
disadvantage of encouraging more activity in a dirty industry, which is 
counterproductive.  Paying for ex post cleanup can be thought of as a subsidy; for 
example, municipal solid waste collection only occurs because government provides a 
payment for somebody to do it.  Unlike a tax on waste emissions, such cleanup does not 
reduce the amount of waste generated.  Nevertheless, if polluters cannot be identified or 
if taxes can be avoided by, say, “midnight dumping,” there may be no alternative. 
An alternative EI is a cap-and-trade system, in which a limit is set on the total 
quantity of pollution allowed.  This aggregate cap is then allocated to individual polluters 
through a permitting process, and may be auctioned or may be distributed without any 
additional charge.  The holders of the pollution permits may in turn trade them to another 
entity for a mutually-agreed upon price.  Although seemingly different on the surface, 
such a system is really quite similar to a tax: just as under a Pigouvian tax they must pay 
a tax for each unit of pollution, in the cap-and-trade system polluters must purchase a 
permit (or must forego the opportunity of selling one).  Thus, a cap-and-trade system is 
formally equivalent to a Pigouvian tax: if a cap allowing pollution level Q leads to 
permits trading at a price P, then a tax set at P will lead to a level of pollution Q.  
However, the cap-and-trade system, if properly implemented, guarantees the level of 
pollution (Q), but not the cost (P); the tax system guarantees that the marginal cost of 
  6cleaning up pollution will be P, but does not guarantee that the level of reduction will be 
Q. 
The foregoing EIs all work through economic incentives.  There are also other 
types of corrective policies, including ordinary regulation, frequently called “command 
and control” (CAC).  Depending on the nature of the regulation, CAC policies may often 
be the easiest to administer.  For this reason, they are by far the most common approach 
to pollution control.  However, they do not have the same efficiency properties as EIs.  
For example, they typically impose a one-size-fits-all mandate on all polluters, making 
them especially burdensome when there is a great deal of variability in the costs for 
different polluters to clean up.  They also typically do not provide incentives for polluters 
to find better ways to reduce pollution. 
As summarized by Cointreau and Hornig (2003), these EI can be broadly 
classified into three categories: revenue-generating instruments, or those EI that produce 
revenue for governments (e.g., charges, taxes, reductions in subsidies, or auctioned 
permits), revenue-providing instruments, or those EI that allow producers and service 
providers to receive income from governments (e.g., fiscal incentives, development 
rights, or charge/tax reductions), and non-revenue instruments, such as deposit-refund 
schemes and grandfathered permits.  Traditional CAC regulation is also revenue-neutral. 
 
2. Economic Instruments in Context: Legal, Institutional, and Cultural Considerations 
This standard analysis of economic instruments for pollution control is an elegant 
application of economic theory, and it provides powerful insights into the advantages of 
EIs over traditional command-and-control instruments.  However, like all basic models, it 
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evaluated before actually implementing any EI, and especially when implementing in a 
decentralized fiscal system.  Adopting an instrument that is cost-effective only under 
particular circumstances may be quite ineffective if those circumstances do not hold. 
There are, we believe, five key requirements for EI mechanisms to be effective. 
First, participants (i.e., individuals or firms whose polluting behavior is to be 
modified) must be familiar with market prices or, in the context of tradable permits, with 
market transactions.  This requirement is probably the easiest to meet, especially when 
applied to firms.  However, households in some cultures may be more familiar with 
bartering and haggling, and may be less familiar with a posted price.  Even if they are 
familiar with posted prices in some contexts, if their behavior in, say, water use is guided 
more by tradition or habit, rather than by constant re-optimization, they may not be 
responsive to taxes or fees set at politically acceptable levels; even so, the standard theory 
can accommodate this point by simply describing it as a case of an extremely inelastic 
demand. 
Second, in the case of firms, another key requirement for EI mechanisms to be 
effective is that decision makers must maximize profits.  (At a minimum, profit must be 
one important objective.)  Even in highly developed countries such as the U.S. and those 
in Europe, this point cannot be taken for granted.  So-called “principle-agent” problems 
may arise when actual decision makers do not have the interests of the firm’s owners.  A 
plant manager, for example, may care more about making his work-day run smoothly 
than maximizing the profits of shareholders whom he has never met.  In developing 
countries, especially in communist or former-communist countries, managers may have 
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goals.  The potential for this problem is compounded by the presence of “moral hazard”, 
in which counterproductive actions are taken by agents in response to incentives created 
by government policies.  For example, even if managers are keenly watching the bottom 
line, they may also be shrewdly aware of the fact that costs incurred from paying 
pollution taxes or fees, or from purchasing pollution permits, can be recovered from 
governments or from parent companies.  Such “soft budgets” (Kornai, 1979) may show 
up in the form of subsidies, lowered taxes, or more favorably administered prices.  By the 
same token, subsidized pollution abatement may trigger reductions in these side-
payments. 
Western experience shows that such results can be quite subtle.  For example, 
consider the case of U.S. electric utilities.  This industry operates under a cap-and-trade 
system for sulfur dioxide (SO2) pollution, in which the industry receives a certain number 
of free permits to cover a limited quantity of emissions but which can be bought or sold 
from one firm to another at prevailing market prices.  In a competitive industry, the 
increased marginal cost of pollution will tend to increased electricity prices, which 
provides an incentive for consumers to conserve electricity and an incentive also for 
firms to operate more cleanly.  However, the electric utility industry has traditionally 
operated as a regulated monopoly, charging an administered price for electricity that 
reflects a fixed mark-up over average costs.  Despite a wave of de-regulation in the 
1990s, much of the industry continues to operate under this arrangement.  Parry (2005) 
shows that, in this context, increased marginal costs can be offset by the decline in 
average costs due to the lump-sum transfer of the emissions quota.  In such a case, 
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increase, and there will be no signal to consumers to conserve energy. 
In developing countries and, again, especially in communist or former-communist 
countries, such effects may be quite important.  Söderholm (2001) emphasizes the role 
that administered prices, centrally granted investments, and output targets still hold in 
Russia, all of which undermine the effectiveness of pollution charges.  Bell (2005) argues 
that the same issues are relevant for China, where much of the industry continues to be 
directed by the state. 
A third requirement for EI mechanisms to function properly is the monitoring of 
pollution.  Obviously, if emissions fees are to be collected, or if tradable permits are to be 
required to be held to cover emissions, those emissions must be observed in a cost-
effective manner.  For this reason, non-point sources of pollution (such as agricultural 
run-off, or automobile tailpipe emissions) are rarely if ever covered by EI mechanisms.  
Rather, even developed countries that embrace EI mechanisms in other contexts use 
command-and-control regulation such as best-management practices for agriculture and 
catalytic converters for cars.  They may also tax proxies for pollution such as gasoline.  
Municipal solid waste provides another intriguing example.  Although some cities have 
experimented with charges by weight or volume, such payments can be easily avoided 
with “midnight dumping”.  Where EI mechanisms are used, non-revenue generating 
mechanisms such as a deposit-refund system, or revenue-providing instruments such as a 
subsidy to recycling, are more common.  Here, actors have the incentive to prove their 
compliance (so as to collect their refund/subsidy). 
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of discrete points (e.g., filling stations, smoke stacks, or water pipes) and where those 
points cannot be easily bypassed via “leaks” in the system.  Even where most likely to be 
successful, the continuous monitoring systems that must be installed to monitor and 
record emissions can be expensive and sophisticated equipment.  The expense of such 
systems is sometimes given as a reason that EI mechanisms are not feasible even for 
large point sources in poor countries.  However, it can also be seen as a concrete 
opportunity for donors to assist pollution-control efforts. 
Fourth, enforcement of any violations must be consistent and sufficient to 
discourage cheating.  If polluters, even if detected, know that they will not pay a penalty, 
then they will not have the needed incentive to reduce pollution.  Weak laws, corrupt 
prosecutors or courts, and a lack or inability to bring legal action on behalf of the public 
all have the potential to undermine the enforcement of environmental provisions (Bell, 
2005).  In the case of revenue-generating instruments, such enforcement might be 
expected to be similar to the enforcement of tax laws.  So long as pollution fees are 
covered by the same branch of law, performance with public finances may indicate the 
success of future performance with EI mechanisms.  There is in fact a large literature on 
“optimal enforcement” schemes (Kwerel, 1977; Segerson, 1988; Kritikos, 2004). 
Fifth and finally, it is important for any environmental policy instrument to be 
accepted by the participants involved.  Not all instruments are familiar or acceptable in 
all cultures.  It took many years of discussion before a cap-and-trade system could be 
tried in the U.S., and more years of experience with early programs before it became 
widely accepted.  These systems still are not used widely in Europe.  On the other hand, 
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speculate about the reasons: Americans are more willing to commoditize anything and 
more opposed to taxes, Europeans are more interested in making polluters pay, 
Americans are more focused on achieving a specific quantity target, and so on 
(Harrington et al., 2004).  Whatever the reason, the important point is that not all 
instruments will go over equally well in all cultures, even if the economic conditions are 
the same. 
We have focused here on requirements for EIs to be fully effective.  However, we 
do not want to leave the impression that, wherever any of these requirements are not fully 
met, EIs will be a complete failure, or that CAC or other non-revenue and regulatory 
instruments will be preferable.  Each requirement is one of degree, and must be assessed 
qualitatively.  Moreover, many of these considerations are important for CAC 
instruments as well.  For example, a traditional CAC regulation requiring the installation 
of some specific pollution-reducing equipment too will fail if violations of the regulation 
are not detected and enforced.  Policies must be evaluated according to these criteria on a 
case-by-case basis, and conclusions will no doubt differ for different societies and 
different pollution problems. 
 
3. Some Experience with Economic Instruments 
Before implementing any sophisticated market strategies for reducing pollution, it 
is essential to examine the experience we have already had with EIs, most of which has 
occurred in developed countries.  Such experience is extensive, and covers an array of 
instruments for all types of pollutants.  In fact, multiple instruments are often used for a 
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examining the treatment of a particular type of pollution in the U.S. and Europe, found in 
11 of 12 cases that a mixture of several tools was used, including both CAC and EIs 
(Harrington et al., 2004).  The U.S. acid rain program, which instituted tradable permits 
for SO2 emissions on electric utilities, provides an example.  All plants, new and old, fall 
under the cap on total emissions, perhaps the most important EI precedent; Stavins (1998) 
has called this program “the grand experiment”.  At the same time, new plants must meet 
“new source performance standards”, which require meeting a maximum rate of 
emissions per unit electricity, a rate usually set according to “the best available control 
technology”.  These performance standards were a legacy of older regulatory approaches 
kept because of distrust of the EI instrument, and can now be justified as a way to 
guarantee that trading patterns in pollution permits do not create “hot spots” in a 
particular area.  Unfortunately, they also provide an incentive to keep older, dirtier power 
plants (which by law are not required to meet the standard) in operation longer.  To offset 
this perverse effect, a process known as “new source review” examines major 
investments at older plants to determine whether they effectively made the plant a “new 
source” for regulatory purposes. 
What can we learn from such an experience?  We draw three key lessons; see 
Harrington et al. (2004) for more details and for additional lessons.  First, as textbook 
theory predicts, EIs are more efficient than CAC regulations.  For example, in the U.S. 
acid rain program, permit prices have traded substantially lower than predicted, 
suggesting that cost-saving methods of reducing pollution emerged in response to the 
economic incentives.  Carlson et al. (2000) estimate that the cost savings from trading are 
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Ellerman et al. (2000) similarly estimate the savings to be about 55 percent.  In contrast 
to this success, Sweden’s outright ban of trichloroethylene, a toxic solvent used in metal 
degreasing, met with failure and was repealed.  Protests came from a small number of 
firms experiencing high costs (Sterner, 2004).  As noted previously, such cost 
heterogeneity is a prime example where EIs are preferable to one-size-fits-all regulations. 
Second, EIs can be more efficient dynamically than CAC instruments.  As the 
U.S. phased out lead in gasoline in the 1980s, it allowed trading to aid small, struggling 
refineries.  It also allowed emissions “banking”, in which emissions could be reduced by 
a greater amount in the present to allow emissions above a (tighter) cap at a later date.  
Newell and Rogers (2004) estimate the banking alone save more than $225 million, with 
the total program saving hundreds of millions more.  Even without banking, EIs can 
provide incentives to identify new ways to reduce pollution more cheaply.  Such dynamic 
effects are most likely to be important for highly technical problems such as gasoline 
refining (where substitutes were found for lead) and air pollution reductions.  In the latter 
case, although there have been few new technologies invented, experimentation with 
processes (e.g., fuel blending) has led to important discoveries that have reduced costs.  
This consideration may be less important for situations that require basic actions, or 
actions that are likely to be part of any cost-effective solution for the foreseeable future.  
Examples might include basic sanitation or buffers between livestock and water sources. 
Third, administrative, monitoring, and enforcement costs can differ on a case-by-
case basis.  As suggested by the Swedish trichloroethylene experience, cost heterogeneity 
can cause administrative problems for CAC regulations.  In contrast, pollution fees and 
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been implemented in Europe without any reference to firm-level costs (Harrington et al. 
2004).  As one would expect, monitoring is more costly and demanding for EIs.  Again, 
however, some aspects of the problem can be subtle.  For example, in the U.S. lead 
phase-out, pollution standards were set in terms of lead content (i.e., per unit gasoline).  
As it turns out, monitoring lead was fairly straightforward because it could be checked 
against sales figures from suppliers.  Gasoline volume (the denominator) was harder to 
monitor, so a straight cap on lead use rather than on lead content would have been easier 
to enforce (Newell and Rogers, 2004). 
Enforcement of EIs has generally been cut and dried.  One advantage of these 
instruments is that they are generally defined objectively, in terms of physical outputs.  In 
contrast, some CAC regulations, such as the use of a “best available control technology”, 
are quite subjective, and require substantial executive rule-making, which in turn in turn 
may be challenged in court.  The U.S. experience with such regulations has involved 
substantial legal proceedings.  In many cases, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
have stepped in to require compliance to fill the void left by executive agencies (Bell, 
2005).  However, the Europeans, who in general seem less litigious, do not seem to have 
had these difficulties (Harrington et al., 2004). 
 
4. Implications for the Choice of Pollution-control Mechanisms in Developing Countries
As emphasized previously, evaluation of economic instruments must be made on 
a case-by-case basis.  However, the above principles and experiences provide several 
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developing countries. 
First, in cases where monitoring and enforcement is weak, more objectively 
measured standards and behaviors should be targeted.  Emissions standards, taxes and 
fees, or CAC regulations requiring very specific actions may all be preferable to 
standards open to more interpretation.  If requirements such as a “best available control 
technology” or an “adequate margin of safety” create confusion, years of administrative 
review, and years more of legal challenges even in an open country such as the U.S., they 
may face even more difficulties in developing countries.  Emissions standards or 
emissions fees, while in some ways quite sophisticated, are also quite objective in their 
measurement of a physical unit.  Here, donors can help by providing or financing 
expensive monitoring equipment and assisting with their use.  In other cases, where 
enforcement and the rule of law are strong but resources are not available for continuous 
emissions monitors, trading based on proxies, or modeled emissions, may be a feasible 
alternative.  Montero (2004, 2005) reports success with such a program in Santiago, 
Chile, where tradable permits are required to be held, not for actual pollution but for a 
formula based on the technologies employed at each facility. 
Revenue-providing instruments may also be useful.  Far from having an incentive 
to cheat, in these cases polluters have an incentive to prove their compliance in order to 
collect a payment.  Subsidies thus overcome a monitoring problem, but this comes at an 
efficiency cost.  While they provide the correct marginal incentive for polluters to 
produce their product in a cleaner way, they subsidize the polluting activity, so that more 
firms may enter the polluting industry.  On net, subsidies thus may not be effective 
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abatement costs represent a large fraction of profits.  However, they may be quite 
effective if used in combination with another EI.  For example, a deposit-refund is 
essentially a two-part instrument: a subsidy that encourages recycling combined with an 
offsetting tax (or the deposit) that eliminates the accompanying perverse incentive to 
purchase more of the raw material.  In the same way, a tax on dirty cars and/or gasoline 
usage can be used in combination with a subsidy on pollution control equipment to mimic 
a pollution tax (Fullerton and West, 2002). 
Second, where the profit motive is weak, rules may be preferable to those 
mechanisms that rely more upon economic incentives.  Emission standards and 
technology-based standards are consistent with the administrative mindset of firms 
operating in such contexts, or firms that might not respond to fees or subsidies.  As noted 
previously, such dynamics can arise for firms operating in the context of soft budget 
constraints, as in the transition countries.  Consider another example provided by China.  
With assistance from the Asian Development Bank, China has experimented with an SO2 
pollution trading system in its Taiyuan province (Morgenstern et al., 2005).  However, so 
far the experiment has been a disappointment, with few trades (Predd, 2005). 
Table 1 summarizes these recommendations.  Where the rule of law is strong, 
polluting activities are observable, and profit motives are strong, the full power of EIs can 
be unleashed to achieve static and dynamic cost-savings.  Where the rule of law is 
weaker, polluting activities are hard to observe, but profit motives remain strong, 
subsidies (perhaps in combination with other instruments) may be a better approach.  
Where the rule of law is strong but the profit motive is weak, traditional CAC regulation 
  17may be the best option.  Finally, where the rule of law and profit motives are weak, 
environmental improvements will be particularly challenging. 
 








Rule of Law; 
Observability of Activity  Strong; 
High 
CAC Pollution  Fees; 
Permits 
 
As a final recommendation, we note the importance of guaranteeing that the 
chosen instrument is accepted by all relevant parties.  It took some time for permits to be 
accepted in the U.S., but this acceptance did not come easily.  The provisions allowing 
trading were scrutinized and tested by skeptics over several years in the 1980s; industry 
was required to install continuous emissions monitors; permits were assigned serial 
numbers so they could be tracked and not easily counterfeited; and transactions were 
recorded.  Only after these steps were taken was a consensus reached (Bell, 2005).  The 
lesson we draw from this experience is that, if outsiders are beginning to plan an 
environmental policy by thinking about the best instrument, then they have already 
missed a step.  The first step, not to be missed, is to think about the right process for 
choosing an instrument, one that includes local stakeholders.   
 
5. Decentralization: The Assignment of Fiscal Responsibilities 
  18The issue of the appropriate assignment of fiscal functions among the levels of 
government – or the optimal amount of centralization or decentralization – has long been 
debated by economists.   
 
The Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities
The standard normative discussion of this question follows Musgrave (1959) by 
dividing the broad functions of government into three branches: the stabilization, 
distribution, and allocation roles.  If the economic criteria for assignment are efficiency 
and equity, then it is typically concluded that the stabilization function (e.g., smoothing 
business cycles, reducing inflation and unemployment, encouraging economic growth) 
should largely be performed by the central government because the mobility of resources 
makes it unlikely that an effective stabilization policy can be pursued by a lower level of 
government; local governments also have limited powers to borrow or to print money.  
Redistribution also properly belongs to the central government.  Subnational attempts to 
redistribute income are likely to be thwarted by the mobility of high-income individuals 
and of capital, and the attempts to redistribute income will create distortions and 
inefficiencies in geographic location;  the unequal and possibly inadequate fiscal 
capacities of local governments also make centralization desirable on equity grounds. 
However, the allocation function, or the decision to provide local government 
services, should often be performed by local levels of government.  These governments 
can adapt service levels more closely to the preferences of their citizens, thereby making 
available to individuals a wider range of fiscal choices than could be provided by uniform 
central government provision.  This is the well-known “Subsidiarity Principle”, also 
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exception may be cases where the service has wide-spread spillovers, such as a public 
good whose benefits transcend localities.  National defense is a classic example here. 
These considerations suggest a “best practice” assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities across the different levels of government.  Activities such as national 
defense, monetary policy, and income redistribution are appropriately assigned to the 
central government; activities like police and fire protection, trash collection, and local 
roads should be assigned to local governments.  Of course, the actual practice on 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities differs somewhat from these “best practice” 
assignments.  Nevertheless, despite substantial variation in expenditure assignments, the 
broad principles of assignment are generally upheld in most countries. 
However, the argument for decentralization is weakened if the costs of local 
provision are higher due to the smaller scale of local government operations.  
Importantly, the argument for decentralization is also weakened if there are substantial 
spillovers from local government expenditures. 
In this regard, consider “emissions control” or “pollution cleanup” as a 
government expenditure responsibility.  Which level of government should be assigned 
its responsibility?  Put differently, which level of government should be assigned the 
responsibility for “environmental quality”?  Environmental quality is clearly a good that 
has externality – and public good – aspects.  However, there are different “types” of 
environmental quality, and the answer to the expenditure assignment question depends on 
the precise form that environmental quality actually takes.  This is discussed in more 
detail below. 
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Decentralization: The Assignment of Tax Responsibilities
Once expenditure responsibilities have been assigned, tax instruments must also 
be assigned among the levels of government to provide adequate financing for required 
expenditures.  Although there is much diversity in the fiscal structures of national and 
local governments, several general “best practices” have emerged that provide a useful 
point of departure: 
•  Only the central government should impose progressive income taxes.  Due to the 
potential mobility of factors, local government attempts to redistribute income by 
progressive income taxes will lead to the out-migration of mobile, higher-income 
individuals, thereby leaving immobile, lower-income to bear the burden of the 
taxes.  Income taxes are also thought to be effective countercyclical instruments, 
and macroeconomic goals are best pursued by national government policies. 
•  The central government should impose taxes on those tax bases that are 
distributed unequally across jurisdictions, and use the revenues from these taxes 
to equalize fiscal capacities across these areas. 
•  Local governments should rely predominately upon user charges and taxes on 
immobile tax bases; in particular, user charges should be used to finance goods 
that provide measurable benefits to identifiable individuals within a single 
jurisdiction, and taxes should be used to finance local services for which it is 
difficult to identify individual beneficiaries and to measure individual costs and 
benefits.  The assignment of taxes should also meet the test of administrative 
feasibility. 
•  Local governments should avoid taxes on mobile tax bases, especially capital.  As 
with progressive income taxes, the potential mobility of capital or other mobile 
factors of production will lead to out-migration if these factors are taxed at 
higher-than-average tax rates.  By the same token, attempts to induce in-migration 
of mobile factors can lead to a so-called “race-to-the-bottom”, as local 
governments compete with each to attract these factors by extending tax breaks 
and other fiscal incentives. 
•  Local governments should be assigned adequate sources of revenues consistent 
with their expenditure responsibilities.  Local governments should have discretion 
over the rate of some taxes to promote accountability of local officials and to 
establish a link between services demanded and the cost of service provision.  
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collections can grow with the demand of services over time. 
•  Intergovernmental transfers should be used to finance those services that generate 
spillovers to nearby jurisdictions, since strictly local finance will lead to 
inefficient provision.  Suppose, for example, that there are two local jurisdictions 
each of which provides an impure public good (e.g., pollution abatement) whose 
benefits spill over to the other jurisdiction.  It can be shown that each locality 
should receive a subsidy (e.g., a “conditional”, “matching”, and “open-ended” 
grant) on its public good whose magnitude is equal to the marginal benefit of the 
externality, along the same lines as the earlier Pigouvian tax/subsidy (Oates, 
1972; Tresch, 2002).  
 
In practice, few countries rigidly follow these guidelines, although the broad pattern of 
tax assignment is often largely consistent with these prescriptions.  Indeed, around the 
world there are essentially two basic models of revenue assignment that attempt to satisfy 
these principles.  In what might be called the Western or Anglo-Saxon model of “fiscally 
strong local governments” (e.g., the United States, Canada, Australia), local governments 
independently legislate and administer their own taxes, an approach that obviously gives 
local governments significant fiscal autonomy and adequacy.  However, this model is 
probably not appropriate for many countries.  Instead, in many other countries the model 
is one of “fiscally weak local governments” that do not generate much revenues from 
their own sources, that do not independently legislate and administer their own taxes, but 
that are often allowed to add a local tax onto the back of some existing central 
government tax.  This approach is being increasingly used as part of decentralization 
reforms around the world (Bahl and Linn, 1992). 
It is useful to discuss in more detail the major types of taxes that are used by 
many local governments, since this discussion relates directly to the design of 
environmental taxes in a decentralized system. 
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a common and important tax for municipal governments, especially those in the Western 
or Anglo-Saxon tradition.  The property tax is in many ways an attractive revenue source.  
If measured properly, its base should increase with urban growth.  Because property can 
be assessed by physical inspection, the tax is difficult to evade.  There is much evidence 
that the tax has at least a proportional and often a progressive effect upon the distribution 
of income.  The tax is unlikely to create serious distortions in land markets, and may in 
some circumstances actually improve the efficiency of resource use.  Finally, it is 
sometimes argued that the property tax is most appropriately administered at the local 
government level because officials there have a better motivation to collect the tax and 
because the tax can be viewed in part as payment for local services. 
However, there are also major difficulties with the property tax.  The revenue 
potential of the property tax is seldom realized, due largely to significant administrative 
problems in identifying properties, valuing them, adjusting valuation over time, 
collecting revenues, and enforcing penalties.  A particular problem is valuation.  Property 
transactions do not occur at regular intervals, which makes it necessary to impose the tax 
on some estimate of each property's value, and also makes it necessary to use some 
method to adjust this value over time for changes in prices.  Unfortunately, there are few 
good procedures for such valuation.  Experience also demonstrates that it is especially 
difficult to generate major amounts of additional new revenues from the property tax via 
short term reforms.  The property tax is also often rated by individuals in polls as among 
the least popular of all taxes.  It is highly visible, since the tax is typically paid directly by 
individual taxpayers rather than by their employer (as with source-withholding of 
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Administration of the tax is often highly arbitrary and idiosyncratic, especially in the 
procedures used to determine the value of properties; when the procedures used to 
generate this assessed value are performed incompetently, even corruptly, individuals 
rightly perceive the tax as unfair.  The tax base is typically distributed across local 
governments in very uneven ways, thereby contributing to extreme fiscal disparities 
across jurisdictions (or “horizontal imbalances”).  Perhaps as a result, the property tax is 
often seen by individuals as a regressive tax, one in which greater burdens are imposed 
on lower- than on higher-income households.  All of these issues are well-known, but this 
recognition has done little to improve the administration of the tax, even in wealthy 
countries. 
Many local governments impose taxes on automobile ownership and use, such as 
an annual license tax, a registration fee, a transfer tax, a parking fee, tolls, and, at times, a 
fuel tax (although most countries reserve fuel taxes for central government use).  
Automotive taxes are a useful source of revenues for local governments.  Because car 
ownership is concentrated in upper income classes, automotive taxes are likely to 
increase the progressivity of local government finances.  Revenues are likely to grow 
steadily with urban growth.  The taxes can be administered at relatively low cost.  They 
can be used for general financing, but they can also be earmarked to finance road 
construction and maintenance and to decrease congestion and pollution in urban areas.  
However, with a few exceptions, these taxes are a significantly underused source of 
revenue. 
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governments.  Local governments often impose a range of specific excise taxes, 
sometimes called sumptuary taxes, on commodities like beer, liquor, and tobacco.  These 
taxes generate substantial revenues, they are easy to collect, and they may well 
discourage consumption of harmful or “immoral” commodities (or “sin taxes”).  
However, such taxes are also unlikely to grow much over time, they are highly 
regressive, they may not discourage consumption if consumers are unresponsive to price 
changes, and their use is clouded by the possibility of individuals buying commodities (or 
smuggling them from) outside the boundaries of the taxing jurisdiction.  Furthermore, 
collection of excise taxes tends to be concentrated at borders or factory locations, so that 
they are often unevenly distributed across local governments.  It is possible that local 
governments could obtain some revenues from, say, a central government sales tax, by 
adding a surtax onto the central government rate, by sharing a specified percentage of the 
national government collections, or by having a separate retail sales taxes. 
Some other indirect taxes are not suitable candidates for local government use.  
These include import duties, manufacturing sales taxes, value added taxes, and other 
broad-based sales taxes.  These taxes are typically reserved for use by higher levels of 
government.  The administration of a value added tax by local governments is 
particularly complicated and should not be seriously considered, given the usual methods 
of calculation.  Value added taxes are also not suitable for revenue sharing because 
debiting and crediting of the tax tends to be uneven across regions. 
Local governments use numerous miscellaneous taxes and fees, which in some 
cases may be quite important in their finances.  For example, many governments impose 
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Municipal governments also employ a wide variety of “nuisance” taxes.  These include 
stamp duties, license fees, and various minor taxes on advertisements, construction 
activities, nonmotorized vehicles, and the like.  These taxes do not rate highly in revenue 
performance, administrative ease, and efficiency and distributional effects; they also are 
seldom an important source of revenues.  However, they are likely to continue to be used.  
Few local governments impose an income tax, at least one administered entirely by the 
local government itself.  An income tax is difficult to administer at the local level, and the 
central government is seldom willing to share the income tax base with local 
governments.  Given the potential mobility of individuals and firms, the imposition of a 
local income tax would likely generate significant distortions in resource use.  Also, 
given the predominant use of income taxes for stabilization ends, these taxes should be 
reserved primarily for central government use. 
However, it is not uncommon for local governments to impose a surtax, or an 
additional local government tax, on a national government income tax.  The use of such a 
“piggyback income tax” is a common practice in Scandinavian and central European 
countries.  There are a number of reasons for caution in the use of a local government 
piggyback income tax.  A local government income surtax could generate distortions in 
resource use, as individuals move to avoid paying the tax and as cities “compete” with 
one another by changing the tax rate.  A local piggyback income tax could also 
complicate the use of income taxes for stabilization purposes.  The fiscal capacity needed 
to impose a productive local income surtax will differ greatly across localities.  The 
central government may be unwilling to share an income tax base with local 
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rates to allow localities to piggyback without an overall increase in the tax burden.  Still, 
there are some clear advantages to local surtaxes.  The central government administers 
the tax, thereby avoiding unnecessary duplication of administrative efforts.  The central 
government also retains the authority to define the tax base, which reduces locational 
distortions from mobile factors and which also reduces interferences of local 
governments in national stabilization policies, even if these coordination problems are not 
eliminated.  Importantly, local governments are given some discretion in choosing tax 
rates, within some lower and upper bounds, and this choice enhances their ability to make 
effective fiscal decisions.  Some of these same goals can also be achieved by tax sharing 
among governments, although tax sharing does not typically give local governments any 
real authority in the selection of local tax rates and therefore does not promote 
accountability and efficiency in local expenditures.  Surcharges have been increasingly 
recommended as part of decentralization efforts elsewhere, especially in transition 
countries where it is necessary to find some fast and sustainable way to give cities a 
significant fiscal capacity. 
Of course, tax systems are designed to achieve multiple objectives.  An obvious 
purpose is to raise the revenues necessary to finance government expenditures 
(sometimes termed “adequacy”), and also to ensure that the growth in revenues is 
adequate to meet expenditure requirements (“elasticity”).  Another is to distribute the 
burden of taxation in a way that meets with a society’s notions of fairness; such “equity” 
is typically defined in terms of “ability to pay”, such that those with equal ability should 
pay equal taxes (“horizontal equity”) and those with greater ability should pay greater 
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them; in choosing taxes, a common goal is to minimize the interference of taxes in the 
economic decisions of individuals and firms.  Taxes should be simple, both to administer 
and to comply with because a complicated tax system wastes the resources of tax 
administrators and taxpayers.  The appropriate design of taxes requires balancing 
tradeoffs among these various goals. 
However, the implications of locally generated externalities for the appropriate 
assignment – and design – of tax instruments have not been fully considered or analyzed. 
 
6. Economic Instruments in a Decentralized Fiscal System 
The basic analysis of environmental externalities does not take into account the 
level of government addressing the problem, nor does it take into account either the 
interactions among jurisdictions at the same level of government or the interactions 
across levels of a federalist system.  By the same token, the standard analysis of the 
division of fiscal responsibilities and inter-government transfers does not account for the 
environmental consequences of those relationships.  In this section, we draw on both 
literatures to consider the appropriate role for various levels of government when 
internalizing externalities, in different settings. 
 
What is missing in the standard analysis of externalities?  
As noted at the beginning, the standard analysis of externalities does not consider 
that the externality may be generated in a local, or subnational, area, with effects that may 
be confined to the local area or that may spill over to other jurisdictions.  However, the 
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environmental quality actually takes as a locally produced good. 
There are at least three different types of polluting activities (Oates, 2002).  In a 
first type, the overall level of environmental quality for the nation as a whole depends 
upon the aggregate level of waste emissions from all local areas.  The actual level of 
environmental quality in a particular local area may vary across localities, depending on, 
say, local weather conditions.  Even so, however, it is the total amount of emissions from 
all localities that determines the exact level of environmental quality in any local area.  
Examples include global climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer, where 
indeed aggregate worldwide emissions determine the environmental damage at a given 
location. 
A second type of pollutant is one in which the amount of waste emissions in a 
given locality i depends only on the waste emissions in that locality; that is, waste 
emissions in locality i impose costs on residents and business in locality i, but there are 
no spillovers from the pollutants beyond the locality itself.  An example of this second 
type of pollutant is the effects of local waste emissions on water quality in the locality, 
with no spillovers to other jurisdictions (i.e., where the water basin lies entirely within the 
jurisdiction).  A second example is the collection and disposal of municipal solid waste. 
In a third type of polluting activity, local waste emissions in locality i have 
harmful effects in that locality, and these waste emissions spill over to at least some 
immediately surrounding jurisdictions, without necessarily creating an “aggregate” 
externality; similarly, pollutants from some other neighboring localities j≠i spillover into 
jurisdiction i to create a level of environmental quality in i that depends upon emissions 
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emissions, which lies between the two previous polar cases, seems likely to be the most 
common (e.g., acid rain, shared water resources). 
 
What is missing in the expenditure assignment analysis?  
If “emissions control” (or environmental quality) is considered a government 
expenditure responsibility, then which level of government should be assigned its 
responsibility?  The answer to this question depends upon several considerations that are 
not fully considered in the standard analysis. 
A first consideration is which of the three types of polluting activities is being 
considered.  In the first case discussed earlier, where the overall level of environmental 
quality for the nation as a whole depends upon the aggregate level of waste emissions 
from all local areas, it is the national government that should be assigned the 
responsibility for the level of environmental quality, since overall environmental quality 
depends upon the emissions from all jurisdictions; that is, the provision of overall 
environmental quality has the characteristic of a pure public good at the national level, 
and only the central government can (or will) consider the full national effects of waste 
emissions. 
However, in the second case, one might argue that it is the local government in 
each jurisdiction that should be assigned the responsibility for determining the efficient 
level of environmental quality in its jurisdiction.  Because local waste emissions do not 
spill over to any other localities, the local government should be able to determine the 
efficient level of the purely local public good, environmental quality.  Uniform national 
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adjust environmental quality either to the demands of local citizens or to local conditions 
that affect the cost of or optimal approach to pollution control. 
The third case is the most difficult, where local waste emissions in locality i have 
harmful effects in that locality and these waste emissions spill over to some (though not 
all) immediately surrounding jurisdictions.  It is unlikely that each locality will consider 
fully the effects of its waste emissions on surrounding areas, and so it seems unlikely that 
the efficient level of waste emissions (and of environmental quality) will be achieved in 
each locality.  However, the precise form of market intervention is unclear. 
A second consideration is that, as noted previously, to work effectively EIs must 
be backed up by governmental monitoring and enforcement.  Central or local 
governments may differ in these abilities.  Depending on how enforcement activities are 
funded (e.g., out of pollution penalties versus out of general revenues), whichever level 
of government has more resources may have an advantage.  Likewise, whichever level of 
government has the legal authority to enforce violations will also have an advantage.  
Finally, levels of governments more free from corruption will be better able to enforce 
EIs.  This may be the central government because it may be less beholden to any 
particular figure, or it may be local governments because they may be more accountable 
to local populations.  Clearly, the factors discussed earlier will have differing 
consequences, on a case-by-case basis, for which level of government is most appropriate 
to operate a given EI, or for which instrument is most appropriate for a given level of 
government. 
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first and third cases, there is some chance that a local government will choose 
inefficiently “small” levels of environmental quality, in an attempt to attract mobile 
capital (e.g., businesses) from other jurisdictions.  This is the expenditure equivalent of 
the so-called tax-side “race-to-the bottom”, in which local governments compete with one 
another to attract businesses, now by lowering environmental standards rather than by 
lowering taxes. 
More generally, it has frequently been demonstrated that competition between 
local governments can lead to inefficient outcomes, largely because local governments 
attempt to compete for mobile capital by offering fiscal inducements (e.g., lower taxes, 
lower waste emission standards) to businesses in a race-to-the-bottom.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, however, it can also be demonstrated that, even in the presence of fiscal 
competition between local governments, local government fiscal choices can achieve 
efficiency.  The crucial difference between these strikingly different conclusions depends 
largely upon the types of tax instruments that are available to local governments, the 
composition of the electorate, and upon assumptions made about the presence (or the 
absence) of strategic local government behavior (Oates and Schwab, 1988).  In any event, 
the possible existence of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental quality is a factor in favor 
of a more centralized assignment of emissions control (Oates, 2002; Dalmazzone, 2007). 
The effects of this kind of jurisdictional competition have been tested empirically 
for at least two cases of the third type of pollutant, in which effects spill over 
jurisdictions: air quality and transboundary rivers.  In U.S. environmental policy, the 
federal government typically mandates standards of environmental quality that must be 
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and enforce these standards.  In the case of air quality, states were given substantially 
more discretion (and less assistance from the federal government) in the 1980s under 
Reagan’s “new federalism”.  List and Gerking (2000) study the effect of this devolution 
of authority, and find that it had little effect on – and, if anything actually increased – 
expenditures on pollution abatement and actual air quality.   
In the case of water quality, Sigman (2005) similarly finds little over-all effect of 
more state discretion.  However, she does find a small effect of state discretion on 
downstream states or on rivers that form a shared border.  In other words, where the inter-
jurisdictional spillovers are strongest, states that have the discretion to do so “free ride.”  
For example, in a worldwide analysis Sigman (2002) finds worse pollution on 
international rivers than on domestic rivers, with the exception of EU countries where 
cooperation might be expected to be greater.  
 
What is missing in the tax assignment analysis? 
The analysis of Pigouvian corrective taxation (or other policies) typically focuses 
upon a single national choice of the corrective tax, and often ignores the possibility that 
the waste emissions come in different amounts and severities from many local 
governments; that is, the optimal design of local government corrective taxation 
(especially in the three possible cases of waste emissions discussed earlier) is an 
unanswered issue. 
Indeed, local tax systems in most all countries were originally designed for a 
world in which production and consumption were primarily of tangible goods, in which 
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which the factors of production used to make the goods were for the most part immobile.  
In such a world, taxation was a fairly straightforward exercise.  Sales and excise taxes 
could be imposed on the tangible goods that were consumed, by the government in the 
jurisdiction in which consumption (or production) occurred.  Similarly, income and 
property taxes could be imposed on factors where they lived and worked without fear that 
taxes would drive the factors elsewhere.  In making these tax decisions, a government in 
one jurisdiction had no need to consider how its actions would affect the governments in 
other jurisdictions because tax bases were largely immobile. 
There is little doubt that, in principle, decentralization and other associated trends 
(especially competition among local governments and “globalization”, defined loosely as 
increased factor mobility across jurisdictions) changes things, and changes these 
decisions dramatically. 
First, with decentralization tax bases are significantly more mobile across local 
governments.  For example, businesses have more flexibility in choosing where to locate 
because communication and transportation costs have been slashed.  Further, some forms 
of production activity require little in the way of traditional capital and labor, so that 
physical location becomes less important.  Labor, especially skilled labor, also becomes 
more mobile in this environment.  Likewise, financial capital is able to flow quickly 
across local (indeed, state and national) boundaries. 
Clearly, if factors of production can move easily from one location to another, 
then the ability of a local government to tax these factors is greatly diminished.  A 
government that raises its tax rates above those of other jurisdictions risks losing its tax 
  34base to these areas.  Particularly in the case of income from capital, there is much 
speculation that taxation will become increasingly problematic (Mintz, 1992).  In fact, 
there is some empirical evidence (even if not conclusive) that factors are responding to 
these types of tax considerations (Grubert, 1998; Hines, 1999). 
Increased mobility is not limited to factors of production.  Consumers are also 
able to plan their consumption according to tax considerations, and consumption does not 
necessarily occur in the jurisdiction in which a taxpayer resides.  A jurisdiction that 
attempts to tax, say, gasoline more heavily than surrounding areas will find that 
consumers will purchase elsewhere.  Similarly, individuals even in developing countries 
can now purchase many types of products over the internet and thereby avoid paying 
some (or even all) sales taxes.  Additionally, there has been increased consumption of 
services and intangible goods (e.g., computer and information services) that are much 
more difficult to tax than tangible goods.  The once-tight link between the location of 
sales and the location of consumption is now quite loose. 
Second, and relatedly, the measurement, identification, and assignment of tax 
bases are now much more difficult.  Consider a typical multijurisdictional business.  The 
product that the firm makes may be designed in one or more jurisdictions; the firm may 
use inputs purchased in multiple jurisdictions; the product may be produced in several 
places and assembled in a still different location; and the final good may be sold in 
multiple locations.  Because the business operates in multiple jurisdictions, the firm has 
considerable leeway to manipulate prices to minimize its tax liabilities.  This latter 
problem is well known, but its severity has increased with the enormous expansion in the 
number of firms operating in multiple jurisdictions. 
  35Likewise, consider an individual whose income comes from multiple sources.  A 
global income tax requires that income from these sources be aggregated.  However, it is 
easy for an individual to hide, say, interest income from multiple areas.  In the absence of 
information sharing across governments, the ability of a local government to identify 
incomes from other jurisdictions is quite limited. 
Consider finally a consumer who can purchase goods and services in several 
different ways: from traditional local merchants or from company websites.  In the 
former case, identification, measurement, and assignment of the tax base are 
straightforward.  In the latter case, they are not.  Application of, say, sales taxes in this 
new environment poses considerable problems for governments. 
How will local governments respond to these various pressures in their tax 
choices?  Most importantly, as emphasized throughout, the ability of any government to 
choose its tax policies independently of those in other jurisdictions is greatly curtailed.  In 
the presence of mobile tax bases, a single government’s choice of tax policies will have 
effects beyond its own borders and will be affected by the actions of other jurisdictions.  
Accordingly, the analysis of tax choices by local governments must recognize that a local 
government will consider that its actions may elicit responses by other local governments 
as they respond in a strategic manner.  These strategic interactions will have a number of 
effects. 
The overall level of tax rates seems likely to decline.  In particular, if tax bases 
can move easily from one jurisdiction to another, then they will flow from high-tax to 
low-tax areas.  Owners of capital, skilled labor, and consumers will become increasingly 
sensitive to tax differentials in their locational decisions.  As a consequence, it is 
  36commonly argued that governments will face increasing pressures to compete with one 
another by reducing tax rates or by offering special tax incentives, in order to attract and 
to retain the various tax bases.  For example, when a government reduces its tax rates on 
capital income, it thereby attracts capital flows from other jurisdictions, and in doing so 
the government benefits its own jurisdiction.  However, the government’s action also 
imposes costs on the jurisdictions that lose factors of production, and it risks generating 
similar tax-cutting responses from those governments.  With tax competition, there could 
well be a “race-to-the-bottom”, in which overall tax collections decline precipitously as 
local governments compete to attract or to retain their tax bases.  To date, however, the 
evidence here is mixed and inconclusive (Wilson, 1999). 
The composition of local taxes could also change as a result of increased 
difficulty in taxing mobile tax bases.  The overall tax burden from income taxes on 
mobile tax bases like capital and skilled labor will likely decline across local 
governments; tax rates on these factors should also flatten and converge.  In contrast, 
taxes on immobile bases - unskilled labor, physical capital, and property - should 
increase.  Of special note for the use of EIs, charges and fees for specific services should 
rise in importance because these tax bases are largely immobile.  Local governments 
seem likely to turn more frequently to environmental or “green taxes”, as well as to “sin 
taxes on alcohol and cigarettes and to lotteries, in attempts to replace lost revenues from 
mobile bases. 
These compositional changes imply that local tax systems will likely become 
more regressive than at present.  If taxes on capital and skilled labor decline, and if fees 
and charges, sin taxes, income taxes on unskilled labor, and lotteries all increase, and if 
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maintain any progressivity in their tax systems.  Together with an expected decline in 
overall revenues, the ability of local governments to redistribute income to lower income 
individuals will likely diminish. 
The form of local sales taxes is also likely to change.  Local (and other 
subnational) governments may well decide that a destination-based consumption tax that 
is collected by the federal government and distributed to them would be preferable to 
further erosion in their sales tax collections.  Alternatively, they may agree among 
themselves to apply a uniform local sales tax.  They may even radically reform the sales 
tax by moving toward a consumption-based, uniform-rate, destination-principle sales tax, 
as advocated by McLure (1997) and Fox and Murray (1997) among others. 
These latter changes suggest more broadly that local governments may attempt 
greater harmonization (or at least coordination) of their tax systems, in an attempt to 
reduce the negative (fiscal) externalities that one government’s decisions impose upon 
other governments as well as to harmonize and coordinate environmental policies.  Such 
harmonization implies that there should be some convergence in tax rates across local 
governments, and also in the definitions of tax bases.  With harmonization, local 
autonomy in tax policy will obviously diminish (Tanzi, 1991). 
Central governments may effectively induce such harmonization through a system 
of intergovernmental transfers.  If local governments cannot or will not provide adequate 
environmental protection, say because of competition for mobile capital or because they 
do not adequately account for inter-jurisdictional environmental spillovers, central 
governments can increase the level of protection via matching grants (Oates 1999).  
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redistribution conditional on local welfare (which in turn may be a function of all 
jurisdictions’ emissions), central governments can induce local governments to take 
trans-boundary externalities into account.  This is a powerful insight, because it suggests 
that central governments have tools at their disposal that they can employ without 
knowing anything about abatement costs, the optimal way to abate in a local setting, or 
even the extent of transboundary externalities.  So long as local governments know their 
externalities, the central government need only observe outcomes. 
Whether all these changes are good or bad is obviously difficult to determine.  
Even so, it should be noted that these trends both limit and expand the choices that local 
governments can make.  With greater factor and tax base mobility, local governments 
have more power to influence the locational decisions of firms, workers, and consumers.  
Those governments that succeed in these choices will be the ones that are better able to 
match taxes with expenditures, that are better able to give taxpayers the services – 
including environmental protection – that individuals wish for the taxes they pay.  
Previous research has focused mainly on the negative fiscal externalities of tax 
competition.  It is only recently that the positive effects of tax and, especially, of 
expenditure competition have begun to be considered in analytical models of local 
government behavior (Wilson, 1999).  It is these positive effects that deserve more 
emphasis. 
To illustrate, consider a world in which all factors of production are completely 
mobile, there are no transportation or communication costs, and there is a single national 
market for all goods and services.  It might seem that no government at any level would 
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immediate outflow of the tax base from the jurisdiction.  Put differently, it might appear 
that the “vanishing taxpayer” would lead inexorably to the virtual disappearance of 
government. 
Of course, these assumptions are extreme: complete mobility does not now, and 
will never fully, exist.  Even so, this view is surely wrong.  Individuals value the goods 
and services that local governments provide, and they are willing to pay for them.  As 
originally argued by Tiebout (1956), individuals will “vote with their feet” by moving to 
those jurisdictions in which governments provide services that residents value.  Indeed, 
local governments will be encouraged, even required, to make their communities as 
attractive as possible: by providing uncongested roads, a clean environment, pleasant 
parks, quality schools, safe neighborhoods, and the like, all with a tax burden that 
individuals deem responsible and appropriate.  (If individuals value redistribution, as 
many certainly do, then even programs for the poor would survive, albeit at smaller levels 
than currently.) 
In sum, then, even in an increasingly decentralized (and integrated) economy, 
local governments will still exist, they will still impose taxes, and they will still make 
expenditures.  There is no question that these decisions will be circumscribed by the 
possibility of a “vanishing taxpayer”.  However, the existence of such a taxpayer also 
creates opportunities, by giving local governments the potential to influence these 
locational decisions.  Local governments whose prior performance has been poor will 
have little credibility in making policy decisions; the response to those governments with 
sound institutions will be quite different.  There will therefore be pressures on all local 
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choices will be the ones that are better able to match taxes with expenditures, or are better 
able to give taxpayers the services they desire for the taxes they wish to pay. 
 
Conclusions 
There is by now a large literature on the fiscal constraints and opportunities in a 
federal system.  However, there has been less attention paid to the choice of 
environmental instruments in such a system.  We believe that there is much that can be 
learned by bringing these literatures together.  We conclude by drawing several lessons 
from this synthesis.  Our first perspective relates to the choice of which level of 
government should implement environmental instruments when such a choice is open.  
Out second perspective relates to the choice of which instrument might be most fitting at 
different levels of government. 
If a fully functioning federal system offers some choice as to the level of 
government that should take action to reduce environmental pollution, our first and most 
important principle is the geographic scope of the externality.  If the effects of waste fall 
within the same jurisdiction as the source, then local governments are probably best 
situated to address the externality.  If the waste has significant transboundary effects, then 
national governments are better positioned to address it. 
To this first principle, we add several mitigating factors.  First, environmental 
policies must of course be enforced, so levels of government that have stronger police 
and judicial powers and that are freer from corruption are preferable.  Second, even if the 
effects of pollution are local, if local sources of pollution are constituents of a national 
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if the effects of pollution are local, local governments may be unable or unwilling to 
tackle the pollution problem because of fiscal competition.  If it is a question of taxing 
the pollution or polluting industry, then local governments may fear the loss of jobs in 
that industry.  Further, if it is a question of raising taxes on other sources in order to raise 
funds for (say) cleanup or for a revenue-providing instrument, then local governments 
may fear the loss of that alternative tax base.  In these cases, central governments may 
prove more effective or may reduce these problems through revenue transfers.  Again 
however, it is important to recognize the importance of a “race-to-the-bottom”, which 
remains an open question. 
Consider now the alternative perspective on the problem: the choice of 
environmental instruments when the level of government is already determined.  One 
lesson here is perhaps an obvious one but one that must nevertheless be stated clearly.  
Namely, the instrument must be consistent with the fiscal authority of the government.  In 
particular, a revenue-generating instrument must be tied to a treasury with the authority to 
levy and manage those taxes.   
Our second principle is that the instrument should be consistent with the fiscal 
needs of the level of government.  If the jurisdiction is in need of revenues, a revenue-
providing instrument will naturally be more appealing that a revenue-generating 
instrument. 
Third, and similarly, the instrument should depend on the mobility of the 
polluting industry.  Because polluters are naturally more free to move across local 
borders than to move across national borders, central government may have more ability 
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governments may face stronger political pressures to keep the industry.  The local 
government may therefore prefer to use a revenue-neutral or even revenue-providing 
instrument.  At the margin, these can provide the same incentive to polluters to reduce 
their pollution but can impose a lower total burden.  However, local governments must 
also think about the mobility of the polluting industry relative to other tax bases.  The 
funds for a revenue-providing instrument must come from somewhere.  If the other 
sources of revenue are even more mobile than the dirty sources, it would not make sense 
to raise taxes on them further.  Indeed it would make more sense to employ a revenue-
raising instrument for pollution and reduce those other taxes.   
Fourth, EIs are likely to have their strongest advantage in the context of national 
policies.  The reason for this is that much of their efficiency arises from the fact that they 
allow more abatement to be borne by polluters who have lower marginal abatement costs, 
and heterogeneity in these costs is likely to be greater the wider the geographic scope.  As 
Adam Smith himself noted, the gains from trade are limited by the extent of the market. 
At the extreme extent of a pollution market, the arrival of global environmental 
problems such as climate change have posed well-known challenges for environmental 
policy-makers.  However, as the world’s population continues to urbanize at the same 
time as governments are trending toward more decentralized authority, more local 
concerns must not be forgotten.  Such pollution problems as local sanitation and water 
quality continue to be of tremendous human importance and raise policy challenges of 
their own.  Given this range of environmental problems facing policy-makers, no single 
policy prescription could possibly be adequate for all problems.  While the “right” policy 
  43choice will always be highly contextual, the literatures on environmental instruments and 
fiscal federalism provide important insights into the problem. 
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